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Abstract
In a world prone to relativism, any person or institution claiming a consistent 
and unalterable doctrine is misconstrued by those who profess the ‘supreme 
principle’ of the relativity of all principles, the absolute absence of all absolutes. 
Hence, the Magisterium of the Church is often considered outdated and is 
criticized, with possible dangerous consequences. Humans have innate habits 
* Doctorate in Sacred Theology (2012) from the Pontificia Università S. Tommaso 
d'Aquino (PUST) - Angelicum (Rome). In addition to his Canonical Licence 
in Theology from the Universidad Pontifícia Bolivariana (UPB), he also holds 
a Licence in Humanities from the Universidad Pontificia Madre y Maestra 
(PUCMM) in the Dominican Republic. A member of the Clerical Society 
Apostolic Life of Pontifical Right Virgo Flos Carmeli, and of the Heralds of 
the Gospel, he is currently a professor of Dogmatic Theology at the Instituto 
Teológico São Tomas de Aquino (ITTA) in São Paulo, Brazil, and director of the 
Lumen Veritatis magazine. 
 This article is a part of the dissertation, with the same name, competently directed 
by Dr. Gonzalo Soto Posada, for the Canonical Licence in Theology at the UPB.
 Correo electrónico: j.sequeira.ep@gmail.com
 Artículo recibido el 27 de noviembre de 2012 y aprobado para su publicación el 15 de 
abril de 2013.
ISSN 0120-131X | Vol. 40 | No. 93 | Enero-Junio • 2013 | pp. 47-73
Cuestiones Teológicas | Medellín-Colombia
48 | Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 40, No. 93 (enero - junio, 2013)
Joshua Alexander Sequeira
without which they could never be rational, one of these being Synderesis, which 
regulates human activity and is a solid base on which a society of peace can be 
built. Besides, this habit is essentially linked to the order of human rational 
nature and of the Universe, both of which are creatures of God, Who reflects 
His own divine Being in Creation. Thus, when the Church urges all to live 
according to the order of rational nature, far from proposing what is outdated; 
She only offers what can bring peace to human beings. 
Key words: Synderesis, Conscience, Natural law, Freedom, Teaching. 
Resumen
En un mundo cada vez más propenso al relativismo, una persona o institución 
que propone una doctrina consistente e inmutable es mal comprendida por 
aquellos que profesan el ‘principio supremo’ del relativismo de todos los 
principios, de la ausencia absoluta de los absolutos. Así, el Magisterio de la Iglesia 
es frecuentemente visto como anticuado y sufre críticas, con consecuencias 
posibles de gran alcance. El ser humano posee hábitos innatos sin los cuales no 
podría ser racional, entre éstos está la sindéresis que regula sus actividades y es 
la base sólida sobre la cual una sociedad de paz puede ser construida. Además, 
este hábito está relacionado esencialmente con el orden racional del hombre 
y del universo, ambas son creaturas del único Dios, que refleja su propio Ser 
Divino en su creación. Por eso, cuando la Iglesia instiga a los hombres a vivir 
según su naturaleza racional, ella no sugiere lo que es anticuado, pero apenas 
aquello que puede traer paz a los hombres. 
Palabras clave: Sindéresis, Conciencia, Ley natural, Libertad, Magisterio. 
Resumo
Em um mundo cada vez mais propenso ao relativismo, uma pessoa ou instituição 
que propõe uma doutrina consistente e imutável é mal compreendida por aqueles 
que professam o ‘princípio supremo’ do relativismo de todos os princípios, da 
ausência absoluta dos absolutos. Assim, o Magistério da Igreja é frequentemente 
visto como antiquado e sofre críticas, com possíveis consequências de grande 
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alcance. O ser humano possui hábitos inatos, sem os quais não poderia ser 
racional; entre estes está a sindérese, que regula suas atividades e é a base sólida 
sobre a qual uma sociedade de paz pode ser construída. Ademais, este hábito está 
relacionado essencialmente com a ordem racional do homem e do universo, já 
que ambas são criaturas do único Deus, que reflete seu próprio Ser Divino em 
sua criação. Por isso, quando a Igreja estimula os homens a viverem segundo 
sua natureza racional, ela não sugere o que é antiquado, mas apenas aquilo que 
pode trazer paz aos homens. 
Palavras-chave:
Sindérese, Consciência, Lei natural, Liberdade, Magistério.
RELATIVISM
A dictatorship of relativism
Opening any newspaper, we come to face with a problem that has plagued 
the last century: a generalized relativism. The then Card. Ratzinger 
(2005), during the Pro Eligendo Pontifice Mass, said that one of the most 
preoccupying problems of our times is this “dictatorship of relativism that 
does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists 
solely of one’s own ego and desires”. During his pontificate, Benedict 
XVI returned often to the same subject. Likewise Card. Tarcisio Bertone 
(2008) underlined the necessity “to invert the axiom of ethical relativism 
and strongly postulate the existence of an order of truth that transcends 
personal, cultural and historical conditioning and which is perennially 
valid”, so as to reverse the process whereby reason is reduced to only what is 
subject to scientific experimentation. He stresses the need to underline the 
fundamental difference between good and evil, without which “there is no 
other alternative to the reign of the arbitrary” in which “the only criterion 
that remains to determine what is right from what is wrong, is the use of 
force, be it by vote, propaganda or arms and coercion”.
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That leads to hostility to the Magisterium
Now, this dictatorship causes much incomprehension, whereby declarations 
of the Magisterium on questions like abortion, human rights etc. that require 
Catholics to adopt a lifestyle of genuine Disciples and Missionaries of Jesus 
Christ (cf. Document of CELAM - Aparecida) are branded as ‘obsolete’ 
and ‘lacking rational foundation’. Ensuing controversies, fuelled by media 
publicity, are detrimental to the Church; such that the living Magisterium–at 
the service of the Word of God, to teach only what has been handed on, 
listening to It devoutly, guarding It scrupulously and explaining It faithfully 
in accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit, 
drawing from the one deposit of faith everything [that] is presented for 
belief as divinely revealed (cf. Dei Verbum, 10)–is treated as ‘retrograde’ 
and without a voice in a world that ‘moves ahead’. Thus, important issues 
are put in check, like the Church’s freedom of expression, the existence of 
an immutable doctrine in a climate of relativism, and even the actuality of 
Petrine definitions in world issues. 
Fides quaerens intellectum
Therefore, this article will try to implement what Bl. John Paul II (1998) 
defined as the chief purpose of theology: “to provide an understanding of 
Revelation and the content of faith” (n.93). Attempting to investigate the 
‘rationality’ of the Church’s doctrine and translate, for men of our times, 
the Christian mystery and the requirements of being Christian “according 
to the exigencies and possibilities of our times” (John XXIII, 1962, n.2), 
we shall attempt to reveal the judiciousness of the interpolations of the 
Chair of Peter–which presides over the whole assembly of charity (Lumen 
Gentium, n.13)–on world issues. Following St. Anselm’s principle, “Fides 
quærens intellectum”, we shall ponder the ‘rationability’ of the Church’s 
demands, so as to to better comprehend the content of faith, following the 
wise proposal of Fides et Ratio (n.4). 
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MOMENTS IN THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION
The starting point must be a Scriptural foundation. In the Letter to the 
Romans, ch. II, (Rom 2:14-15), the Apostle of the Gentiles states: “For 
when1 the Gentiles who do not have the law, by nature2 observe the 
prescriptions of the law, they are a law for themselves even though they do 
not have the law. They show that the demands of the law are written in 
their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting 
thoughts accuse or even defend them”3. 
Early Christian commentators
For Origen (Super Epistolam ad Romanos, lib. II, c. 9-10), though the 
Gentiles lack the Mosaic Law, they “can to perceive by nature, for instance, 
that they should not murder or commit adultery,” and so the “Natural Law 
agrees with the Mosaic Law according to the spirit but not the letter”. He 
adds (Contra Celsum, lib. I, c.4) that God gave the Written Law to Moses 
after having already written it on the soul, and so this will be the cause of 
censure for sinners who transgress the known notions of morality. Similarly, 
St. Ambrose (De Paradiso, c.VIII, n.39) asserts that God’s commands are 
not read on stone tablets, but rather as impressed upon the human heart 
by the Spirit, thus humans constitute a law to themselves. 
St. John Chrysostom (Homiliae in epistolam ad Romanos, hom. V, 5) 
praises the Gentiles: “they must be admired, since they did not require a law, 
and yet showed all the Law’s deeds, having works and not letters.” Elsewhere 
(Homilies on the Statues to the People of Antioch, XII, 5), he shows how 
1 The Greek text uses ὅταν which has the sense of ‘every time that’, ‘whenever’, and does 
not imply any conditionality, that the word ‘when’ in English may suggest.
2 The phrase by nature, on which the Pelagians base themselves, must be read within the 
general context of the sentence: it refers the light of conscience being opposed to the written 
Sinaitic Law, and does not mean the natural strength which excludes grace, according 
to different commentators (Professores portugueses, 1990, p.526-527; Profesores de 
Salamanca, 1975, p.311-312). For the relationship between grace, faith, law, culpability 
and reason in the Letter to the Romans, see: Geslin (1935, p.55-61).
3 The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) resumes the Apostle’s words in CCC, 
n.1777. 
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Adam–on committing the first sin–hid himself, thereby evidencing his 
knowledge of his wrongdoing; as also Cain who concealed his crafty plan 
while leading Abel to be murdered, and finally denied his crime like his 
father Adam. Chrysostom concludes that at the origins of society, when 
men lacked letters, prophets and even the Law, they already possessed the 
knowledge of good and evil. And leaving all without the excuse of ignoring 
Scripture, he asks from where the first legislators of the gentiles wrote the 
laws concerning marriages, murders, wills, etc., if not from conscience; for 
they could not have learnt it from their elders nor from the prophets. 
For St. Augustine (Enarrationes in Psalmum LVII), the written Law was 
given not because it was not written in the human heart, but since humans 
deserted their own hearts. He proves this stating that just as no one would 
like to suffer at the hands of others–be robbed, killed etc.–all must agree that 
others also think the same way; and therefore that each must treat others in 
accordance to the law on one’s heart. The same happens with good deeds 
too: if one does not like to be refused food when one is hungry, one cannot 
refuse the same to others!
St. Thomas Aquinas
The Aquinate (Expositio et lectura super epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, 
n.217) relates the fact that the Law is written on the heart–even of those 
who do not possess the written Law–with the Scriptural phrase “the Law 
is not made for the just” (1Tim 1:9). This is because humans, instead of 
obeying their consciences, had to be constrained by an external imposition 
of the Law. He also relates Rom 2:14-16 with the promises “I will put my 
Law in their souls, I will write it in their hearts” (Jer 31:33) and “I will write 
it on the tablets of your heart” (Prov 3:3). 
Recent commentaries
More recent scripture-commentators opine similarly (cf. Profesores de 
Salamanca, 1975, p.310- 312; Professores Portugueses, 1990, pp. 526-
529). The passage of Rom 2:12-16 is explained showing the absence of 
contradiction between the Mosaic and the Law on the human heart. Though 
it be true that the Natural Law can be learned by natural reason, men–lead by 
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the disorders of human sensibility and imagination accompanied by the evil 
concupiscence caused by original sin–frequently like to persuade themselves 
that what they do not want to be real is, in fact, false or uncertain (cf. 
Humani Generis, no.2). Therefore, due to the moral–not absolute–necessity 
of divine revelation of the Natural Law (cf. Dei Filius, no.2), God gave it to 
the Chosen People. But, grace is necessary for both Jews (to abide by the 
revealed Law) and Gentiles (to follow their consciences).
SEARCHING FOR A ‘LAW ON THE HEART’
It is thus clear that there is a law engraved on the heart. But, what is it? 
What is its relationship with conscience? To understand this, let us go to 
the moment when a human awakens to the light of reason...
A Child... and the First Principles
Let us take a child (of any race, culture or gender) to whom its mother’s 
points out a chair, saying: “chair.”4 The child immediately relates the object 
with the name, since it possesses a certain primordial reason that enables it to 
discover the world. If this were not so, no one could ever distinguish between 
dissimilar objects: the child would never know a chair from a table and would 
be inept to learn anything in spite of all the mother’s teaching. Hence, the 
child’s first master is not any human being, but an innate predisposition to 
unequivocally apply the so-called ‘first principles of natural reason’, which 
it starts to use in contact with the environs. 
Starting from a commonplace experience to arrive at the existence of 
first principles as the basis of human rational action, Sanguineti (2005, 
pp.178-193) identifies some characteristics of these principles: they are 
universal, immediate, final (they are not in turn justified by other principles) 
and founding (they justify all knowledge acquired having them as a base). 
4 The example is adapted from a long demonstration by Garrigou-Lagrange (1980, pp. 
99-109).
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Since this article does not explicitly verse on the first principles, we only 
point out where ample and well demonstrated arguments are found,5 before 
passing on specifically to one first principle. 
The Principle of Contradiction
This principle can be voiced as: “That which is, is; that which is not, is 
not”. In our example, this principle implies that looking at the chair, our 
hypothetical infant is able to distinguish it from the wall against which it 
is placed. The chair is one thing, the wall is another....and neither of the 
two is the child! This notion is innate: without it, all rational activity would 
be impossible. 
This principle is so evident, that even the ancient Greeks did not ignore 
it,6 whereby Llano (2004, p.292) lucidly states that “to him who denies this 
principle, it can be proved that his very negation destroys itself ”7. Likewise, 
Garrigou-Lagrange–with typical French charm–comments that without this 
first principle, a shepherd would not be able to distinguish a sheep from a 
wolf, and no one would know the difference between a table, an elephant 
5 For example, see the works of Alejandro Llano (2004, pp.6 8-71), who refutes principally 
the objections based on the Cartesian universal negation; and also Santiago Ramírez 
(1958, p.76-80).
6 For example, Aristotle affirms (cf. Metafísica, IV 4 1006a, pp.5-15) that although some 
demand that the principle of contradiction be demonstrated, this follows from want 
of education, “for to ignore of what one should demand demonstration, and of what 
one should not, argues want of education.” He continues that it is impossible that a 
demonstration of everything exists; for in this case, one would arrive to the infinite and 
so, there be no demonstration at all! Therefore, he adds, “we can demonstrate negatively 
that this view is insufferable, if our opponent would only say something.” After all, if 
the opponent says nothing, he merits no answer, “for such a man is […] no better than 
a vegetable”. And if the opponent states anything, he must recognize that it is not the 
same as denying it, whereby he has to differentiate between being and not-being.
7 Interestingly, using Aristotle, Llano (pp. 94-95) refutes the Hegelian dialectic, which 
denies the Principle of Contradiction, affirming that all contradictions and contraries 
take place simultaneously. He shows that perpetual change cannot exist; and, if it were to 
exist, there would still have to exist contraries between which any change could possibly 
take place (for without these contraries, change would not exist at all and there would 
be only absolute quietude!).
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or an ant! Therefore, St. Thomas declares (cf. S.T., I-II, q.94, a.2) that what 
first comes under human apprehension is ‘being’, the notion of which is 
included in all things that are learnt. And so, the first indemonstrable 
principle–on which all others are based–is that ‘the same thing cannot be 
affirmed and denied at the same time’ since it is based on the notion of 
‘being’ and ‘not-being’. 
Other First Principles and their Habit – Intellectus 
Principiorum
Having seen one first principle, we must note the existence of other 
similar principles like the Principles of Identity, of Efficient Causality, 
of Metaphysical Causality, of Finality, of Logical Inference, etc. Humans 
possess these first principles in the form of an innate habit (by which they 
have an intuition and a facility to know them) called the Understanding of 
the First Principles (or Intellectus Principiorum)8.
SYNDERESIS
Forming a parallel with the habit of Intellectus Principiorum, in the sphere of 
practical action humans also possess another habit that provides an intuition 
of the first principles of moral action, called Synderesis9.
Existence of Synderesis
In De Veritate (q.16, a.1, sol.), St. Thomas explains that since there exists 
order in the Universe, between the different grades of beings, there is a type 
of ‘continuity’ (like that of a ramp) and no abrupt fall (like in the case of 
8 Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, lib. VI) conducts a detailed investigation on this habit, 
showing that the first principles must be known intuitively, and calls their habit ‘intuitive 
reason’. On his part, St. Thomas Aquinas (S.T. I-II, q.50, a.4; I-II q.51, a.1, s.c.) refers 
often to these passages of Aristotle, especially in his treatise on habits.
9 Some recent studies on Synderesis are Bourque (1980); Molina (1996); and Sellés (2003). 
These, however, remain within the philosophical ambit.
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a step). Thus the natures of inferior beings–in their highest part–‘touch’ 
the lowest part of immediately superior natures. For example, between 
two orders of beings, plants and animals: animals are more perfect, having 
appetitive, locomotive and sensitive potencies, as well as the so-called 
vegetative potencies of nutrition, growth and reproduction, possessed by 
plants. Yet, certain intermediary creatures that form a sort of ‘transition’ 
between plants and animals: primitive animals whose sensory and locomotive 
potencies are limited,10 or plants with qualities ‘similar’ to animals (like 
carnivorous ones). 
Likewise, between the two great orders of intelligent beings–men and 
angels–there is a ‘continuity’. Human intelligence is discursive and requires 
investigation by the senses and process to arrive at truth: nihil est in intellectu 
quod prius non fuerit in sensu. Thus, it is incapable of natural knowledge 
except by means of material objects coming in contact with the external 
senses. But, the angelic mode of knowing is by an instantaneous intuition 
of truth without investigation or discourse. Now–continues St. Thomas 
(cf. De Veritate, q.16, a.1, co.)–due to the above principle, the human 
soul, according to that which is highest in it, ‘touches’ angelic nature. And 
so, certain things are known by human nature immediately and without 
investigation; though even in these, humans are inferior to angels, for they 
must arrive at truth from what is received by the senses. St. Thomas adds, 
“there is a double knowledge in the angelic nature: one, speculative, by 
which angels see the truth of things simply and independently; and the 
other, practical.” Thus, 
Human nature, in so far as it comes in contact with the angelic nature, must 
both in speculative and practical matters know truth without investigation. 
And this knowledge must be the principle of all the knowledge which 
follows, whether speculative or practical, since principles must be more 
stable and certain. Therefore, this knowledge must be in man naturally, 
since it is a kind of seed plot containing in germ all the knowledge which 
follows, and since there pre-exist in all natures certain natural seeds of the 
 
10 For example, certain moles that do not see, or marine animals (jellyfish, sponges) etc. 
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activities and effects which follow. Furthermore, this knowledge must be 
habitual so that it will be ready for use when needed. Thus, just as there 
is a natural habit of the human soul through which it knows principles 
of the speculative sciences, which we call understanding of principles, so, 
too, there is in the soul a natural habit of first principles of action, which 
are the universal principles of the Natural Law. This habit pertains to 
Synderesis (De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1. co.).
Hence, we arrive at what can be called a ‘definition’ of Synderesis: an 
innate habit of the practical reason that gives man an intuition of the first 
moral principles. We must now analyze each part of this definition.
Synderesis is an Operative, Innate Habit of the Practical Reason
It is vital to not confuse ‘practical/speculative reason’ with ‘superior/inferior 
reason’; terms which appear frequently in literature on Synderesis. ‘Superior 
reason’/‘inferior reason’ were terms used by St. Augustine in De Trinitate. 
These terms–explains the Aquinate (S.T. I, q.79, a.9)–also refer to the same 
intellective potency: reason. When it is applied to eternal and extra-temporal 
things, superior to the soul and immaterial in themselves, it is called the 
superior reason; while being applied to temporal things, inferior to the soul 
and linked to matter (such that the soul ‘divests’ the material aspects by 
its own operation, in order to consider them), it is called inferior reason. 
Thus ‘practical /speculative reason’ and ‘superior/inferior reason’ are un-
confoundable differentiations, referring to the same human reason, treated 
with diverse nomenclature for didactic purposes11. 
11 Synderesis (a habit of the practical reason) deals with universal moral principles, including 
both eternal norms–object of superior reason–like ‘God must be obeyed’; as also inferior 
and temporal norms–object of inferior reason–such as ‘Man must live according to his 
reason’ (cf. De Veritate q.16 a.1 ad 9). Similarly, one can speculate–using speculative 
reason–about something eternal (‘God is pure act’) or something temporal (‘Creatures 
are composed of act and potency’). 
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Besides, Synderesis is an operative habit. A habit12 can be either 
entitative13 (its subject is a substance, which is disposed by the habit in 
its being, quoad esse) or operative (the subject is a faculty/potency and is 
disposed quoad operari modifying its interior dynamism). Operative habits 
are only found in the spiritual potencies, intelligence and will. Synderesis–the 
operative habit under study–has the practical reason as its subject. Also, 
habits can be either acquired (such as those acquired by repetition of acts and 
vices like intoxication); supernatural (the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, 
infused in the soul with sanctifying grace); or innate. Synderesis is an innate 
habit: humans are born with it because of an imperative of nature itself. 
However, ‘innate’ does not mean that humans possess innate ideas (as 
Plato imagined). Neither Intellectus principiorum nor Synderesis provide 
complete ideas, but furnish an intuition of the first (speculative or practical) 
principles. One must confront the principle with experimental reality; that 
is, one must know the terms in which the principle is expressed, so as to 
perceive what it signifies. By knowing the terms, one intuitively discerns the 
principle. This follows from human nature: a combination of matter and 
spirit, humans require that intellect and senses work together in all natural 
knowledge. And so, even in intuitive knowledge humans need to refer to 
physical matter: the first time a child learns experimentally the meaning 
of ‘to kill’, it perceives that one should not kill. The principle ‘Killing is 
wrong’ is not innate, but once what ‘to kill’ is known, the principle is 
perceived intuitively. Therefore, human innate habits require the senses, 
unlike angelic ones.
 Therefore, the use of Synderesis requires the development of the 
intelligence such that abstract thought is possible: the act of Synderesis, like 
all intellectual acts, requires the coming of age. Likewise, on entirely losing 
the use of reason (grave dementia), one does not have use of Synderesis.
12  Amongst Aristotle’s categories (cf. Categorias, c. VIII, n.3-4), a habit is an accident, a 
quality (among nine types of accidents), a disposition (among four types of qualities), a 
relatively stable quality (dificile mobilis - amongst diverse dispositions). 
13  For example, sanctifying grace or habitual grace is an entitative habit, infused in the soul 
as Royo Marín, (1968, p.115-119) explains.
Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 40, No. 93 (enero - junio, 2013) | 59
Synderesis and the magisterium: a theological proposal
SYNDERESIS AND INERRANCY
We now come to a point of capital importance: being an innate habit, 
Synderesis does not err. Commenting Aristotle’s phrase “Principia enim 
manere oportet”, the Aquinte (De veritate, q.16, a.2, co.) states that all 
changeable things can be reduced to (or deduced from) unchangeable things, 
for it would be impossible to have stability or certainty in things derived from 
principles, if these principles themselves were not firmly established. Thus,
For this reason, all speculative knowledge is derived from some most certain 
knowledge, concerning which there can be no error. This is the knowledge 
of the first general principles, in the light of which all else that is known, 
is examined; and by reason of which, every truth is approved and every 
falsehood rejected. In such a manner, that if any error could take place in 
these first principles, there could be no certainty in derived knowledge14. 
In the same way, in order that honesty is possible in human action, there 
must be some permanent principle which has unwavering integrity, in 
reference to which all human works are examined, so that that permanent 
principle will resist all evil and assent to all good. This is Synderesis, whose 
task it is to warn against evil and incline to good. Therefore, we agree that 
there can be no error in it (De Veritate. q. 16, a. 2, co.)15. 
The inerrancy of Synderesis shows that human intellect participates in 
the perfection in which humans are created. All their potencies are perfect 
and inerrant when directed to their ‘special objects’: the five external senses 
with respect to their special objects (cf. Aristotle, De Anima, lib. II, c.6); 
human will, which wants felicity and good necessarily (cf. S.T. I, q.82, a.2, 
sol); speculative reason, which cannot err about its proper object (the first 
speculative principles, cf. De Veritate, q.1). The same happens with the 
14 An example is useful here: No student could ever study mathematics securely, if he did 
not have absolute certainty that 2+2 =4 always, or that he could confide in his ability 
to add and count!
15  A few years later, commenting on the phrase ‘Omnis intellectus est rectus’ of Aristotle 
(De Anima, Lib. III c.10 433 a26), St. Thomas draws a parallel between the inerrancy 
of the first principles–practical and speculative–because, together, they form the base 
of the intellectual edifice (Cf. In De Anima, Lib III, lect. 15, n. 9).
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practical reason. Before analyzing the splendid significance of this inerrancy, 
let us understand how Synderesis is applied to act.
SYNDERESIS AND CONSCIENCE
The habit of Synderesis is applied by conscience. The latter–St. Thomas 
clarifies–is neither a potency nor a habit, but an act. Commonly, the word 
conscience has three meanings: 1. the act by which a person judges (e.g. 
Job 27:6 and 2Cor 1:12), whether he has (or not) done something (here 
the conscience testifies whether one has executed a past action, which act 
pertains to the memory); 2. the act (for ex. Heb 10:2) by which one judges 
whether a certain deed must (or must not) be practiced (here the conscience 
instigates, induces or obliges to action, by the application of knowledge to 
a future act); 3. the act (e.g. Ps. 17:3; Jo 8:9) by which one makes a moral 
judgment about a past action (here conscience accuses one of the justice 
or wickedness of an action). In the acts of instigating/inducing/obliging 
(examining what must be done in the future); or accusing (probing past 
acts), three habits of the practical (operative) reason are applied: wisdom (by 
which superior reason reaches its perfection), knowledge (by which inferior 
reason reaches its plenitude) and Synderesis16. These three habits are either 
applied individually or simultaneously (cf. De Veritate q.17, a.1. sol). It is 
in applying Synderesis (inerrant in itself ) by conscience that one can err. 
Errors of the Act of Conscience
The act of the conscience is similar to a syllogism, since it applies the universal 
principle of Synderesis to a particular situation. The premise presented by 
16 Speculative reason has the natural habits of understanding (Intellectus principiorum), 
wisdom and science (S.T. I-II, q.57, a.2); while practical reason has (amongst others) 
Synderesis, wisdom, science, art and prudence (S.T. I-II, q.57, a.3-4). For more on this, 
see: Sellés, (2008). Others also include habits like mathematical and logical habits in 
the practical reason. We limit ourselves to habits that influence conscience together with 
Synderesis. The latter is applied either alone, or generally with the habits of science and 
wisdom. 
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Synderesis–universal and always correct–is used by conscience together with 
a particular proposition offered by superior or inferior reason to formulate 
a judgment17. Now, in a syllogism, an error can occur for two reasons: 
if the starting point–the premise–is wrong or if it is wrongly reasoned18. 
Since the universal premise of Synderesis is always correct, conscience can 
err in mounting its syllogism if the particular premise–from the superior or 
inferior reason–is wrong or if there is a flaw in the form of the syllogism. The 
particular premise offered by the reason can be erroneous due to ignorance 
or the profession of erroneous principles. Let us examine these causes. 
Ignorance in moral matter is the absence of necessary knowledge in a 
capable subject (person); and can be either invincible or vincible. Invincible 
ignorance excuses responsibility before God, for it is entirely involuntary 
(cf. CCC, n.1793)19 and the act is realized with absolute tranquility of 
conscience. On the contrary, vincible ignorance is always voluntary and 
culpable according to the degree of negligence in verifying the truth: the 
subject realizes his ignorance, but does nothing (or very little) to know 
17 St. Thomas explains in De Veritate (q.17 a.2 sol.): If Synderesis declares ‘nothing contrary 
to the law of God can be done’ and the superior reason says ‘Doing such a thing is 
contrary to the law of God’, then the conscience judges ‘Doing such a thing cannot be 
done’.
18 Ex.1. One may know–by Synderesis–that nothing contrary to God can be done, but 
if one is a Manichaean, one might believe erroneously that swearing is intrinsically 
contrary to the divine law, and so conclude that one should never swear (cf. De Veritate 
q.17, a.2. Sol). Here, superior reason offered a wrong premise to conscience. Ex.2: The 
assassins of the Apostles erred not because Synderesis did not declare that one needs 
to serve God, but because superior reason offered the false premise that the apostles’ 
death pleases God (cf. Jn 16:2). Based on one correct universal proposition and a false 
particular one, conscience arrived at a wrong conclusion (cf. De Veritate q.16, a.2. ad 2). 
Ex. 3: With respect to civil laws, one can–by ignorance–mistake something prohibited 
for what is permitted by the law. With this false premise, offered by inferior reason, 
one can err (while still judging that one is being honest since one follows the correct 
judgment of Synderesis that civil authority be obeyed). In all three examples, the wrong 
particular proposition offered by the reason (the first two, superior reason; the third, 
inferior reason) does not exonerate the person from guilt entirely, for these erroneous 
principles may be fruit of earlier errors or ignorance.
19 However, this ignorance is not excusable before men, for it is often impossible to prove 
and all criminals could allege ignorance of the law that they had violated…
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his duties well20. Even so, vincible ignorance diminishes, to some extent, 
the voluntary nature of an act, and as a result makes it less culpable (Royo 
Marín, 1996, p. 62)21. 
We now pass on to the other cause of error: a false particular principle, 
which might be fruit of earlier faults that produced false principles. 
For example: Augustine’s dissolute life led him to diverse sects, like the 
Manichaean, and to accept their erroneous principles. Years later, on seeing 
his questions unanswered by the Manichaeans and their leader Faustus, if 
Augustine had lacked the integrity to procure an answer for his problems 
of conscience (and preferred to continue where he was out of commodity 
or vice), he would have continued, culpably, to profess erroneous principles 
(Augustine, Confessions, lib. V, c.6-7)22. 
Finally, just as in the case of syllogisms in speculative matters where, 
if one neglect correct structure, one can arrive at a wrong conclusion; so 
also, in the syllogism necessary for the judgment of conscience, one can 
err. However, the Aquinate explains that conscience cannot err in certain 
syllogisms: when the particular proposition to which conscience applies 
itself is included in Synderesis’ universal declaration23. 
These three–ignorance, false principles, and incorrect syllogism–are the 
only ways in which the universal principle of Synderesis can be incorrectly 
applied by conscience. But, there also exists another type of ‘error’, which is 
20 The Catechism states (CCC, n.1791): “This ignorance can often be imputed to personal 
responsibility. This is the case when a man ‘takes little trouble to find out what is true and 
good, or when conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the habit of committing 
sin’ (Gaudium et Spes, 16). In such cases, the person is culpable for the evil he commits”.
21 If, however, ignorance is deliberately fostered, guilt is not diminished since the subject 
did not want to know his duty so as not to be obliged to fulfill it. 
22 Obviously, God’s mercy would not deny Augustine many other opportunities for 
conversion.
23 St. Thomas exemplifies this (De Veritate. q. 17, a.2. sol.): One cannot err in this syllogism: 
‘The whole is greater than its parts’; ‘the cake is a whole’; therefore ‘it is greater than any 
part’. Similarly conscience cannot err in this: ‘I must not love God’ or ‘Something evil 
must be done’. This is because the particulars ‘I’ and ‘something evil’ are included in 
the universal ‘God must be loved’ and ‘no evil must be done’. 
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not really an inaccuracy of conscience, but a tragic consequence of degraded 
human nature. 
‘Error of Conscience’ – Dragged by the Will
Another way in which conscience can ‘err’ pertains to the will and not to 
the intellect (cf. the case of Hymenaeus and Alexander, narrated in 1Tim 
1:19). After conscience judges correctly, based on well applied principles, 
one can still be dragged by the force of concupiscence or other passions 
which absorb reason to such an extent, that one chooses the contrary to 
what Synderesis proposes (cf. De Veritate q. 16, a.3. sol.). This is worsened 
by vices, habits acquired by the repetition of an error, which drag the will 
to go against Synderesis24. This state of corruption is complex25 and the 
extent of guilt varies according to each situation and depends on factors 
like earlier good deliberations, gravity of vice, the reason for falling into 
it etc. (cf. Royo Marín, 1996, p.70)26 Other factors like fear and violence 
also diminish the voluntary nature of an act, and can influence the wrong 
application of Synderesis, whereas still other factors like age, gender and 
social setting influence human action so remotely, that their effect is not 
considerable (cf. De Veritate, q. 16, a.3. sol.). 
24 St. Thomas explains in De Veritate (q. 16, a.3. ad 3.): One who has contracted the habit 
of a vice loses the principles of activity, not as universal principles, but in their application 
to some particular case, insofar as through a vicious habit, reason is muffled in order to 
keep it from applying the universal judgment to its particular activity when making its 
choice.
25 St. Paul refers to such cases in Tit 1:15-16: “To the pure all things are pure, but to the 
corrupt and unbelieving nothing is pure; their very minds and consciences are corrupted. 
They profess to know God, but they deny him by their deeds; they are detestable, 
disobedient, unfit for any good deed”.
26 It is worth noting that an acquired habit can, when causing a fault, diminish the liberty of 
the act without extinguishing its voluntary nature entirely. If the habit was not retracted 
earlier, it diminishes liberty with relation to the actual deed, but not in relation to its 
cause which was voluntarily and freely set.
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Synderesis is common to all men and cannot be extinguished
It is obvious that Synderesis is common to humans of all races and conditions, 
in all times, since it is an innate habit of the intellect, and rationality is part of 
the essence of ‘man’. Thus, in spite of social, economic or cultural conditions, 
or even doctrinal, moral and cultural formation, all possess Synderesis.
Besides, Synderesis cannot be smothered (cf. De Veritate. q. 16, a. 3), for 
being part of human nature, cannot be extinguished. Considering, though, 
only the act of Synderesis, St. Thomas concedes it said to be extinguished 
“inasmuch as it is completely interfered with. This happens in those who do 
not have the use of free choice or of reason due to an impediment caused by 
an injury to the bodily organs which reason needs to function” (De Veritate. 
q. 16, a. 3, sol.). These lesions aside, Synderesis necessarily functions well, 
indicating truth in universal operative things. However, it can be deviated 
by degraded human nature: “In a particular act, [the act of Synderesis] is 
destroyed whenever one sins in choice. For the force of concupiscence, or of 
another passion, so absorbs reason that the universal judgment of Synderesis 
is not applied to the particular act.” The Aquinate concludes brilliantly: “But 
this does not destroy Synderesis altogether, but only in some manner. Hence, 
absolutely speaking, we conclude that Synderesis is never destroyed.” This 
destruction ‘in some manner’ is rather a non-application of the inerrancy 
of Synderesis to a particular act, in order to satisfy one’s erroneous passion: 
Synderesis did not err, but rather the one who chose not to apply its universal 
principle. Therefore Teófilo Urdanoz (1954, p.119-120) comments: 
St. Thomas places at two extremes, two totally incorruptible habits: the 
habit of the first speculative principles and that of the moral principles or 
Synderesis. These do not suffer direct destruction, for they do not have 
any contrary dispositions. There are neither errors nor ‘forgetments’ that 
prevail in face of the immediate intellectual evidences produced by the 
unchangeable judgments of the first principles, even of the moral order; 
the Natural Law cannot be abolished from the heart of man (I-II q.94, 
a.4; a.6). Nor can they disappear because of the destruction of the subject, 
since the spiritual faculties are incorruptible. 
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From what has been stated, if Synderesis–being inerrant and common 
to all–is applied uprightly by conscience, anyone can perceive the moral 
principles that should direct one’s actions without error. And so, with respect 
to the moral principles, there is a ‘common factor’ universally applicable 
to all, a moral system that constitutes a true law of human action. This law 
is part of the internal order of the human being, and is the Natural Law. 
St. Thomas defines it as “the rational creature’s participation of the eternal 
law” (S.T. I-II, q.91, a.2). 
NATURAL LAW AND LIBERTY
Natural Law and its Relation with the Eternal Law
Firstly, one must comprehend the significance of the Eternal Law, which St. 
Augustine defines as “the divine order or will of God, which requires the 
preservation of natural order, and forbids the breach of it” (Contra Faustum, 
lib. XXII, c. 27). St. Thomas says the same (cf. S.T. I-II, q.93, a.1), defining 
it as the plan of Divine Wisdom by which all the acts and movements of 
creatures are directed towards the common good of the universe27. He 
explains that rational creatures are subject to the Creator’s Providence in a 
more excellent way than others, for they are not led blindly by instincts, but, 
participating in the Eternal Reason (because of intelligence), they are able 
to choose their own means towards the Supreme Good and thus provide for 
themselves and others. He concludes (S.T. I- II, q.91, a.2): “this participation 
of the Eternal Law in the rational creature is called the Natural Law”. Thus, 
a rational creature acts in perfect harmony with the order of the Universe 
(and the internal order of its own being) on following the Natural Law. 
This shows the beauty and cohesive order in Creation, and sings the glory 
of the Divine Wisdom, which “reaches mightily from one end of the earth 
to the other, and orders all things well” (Wis. 8:1). The word ‘Natural’ is 
used since the precepts of the Natural Law are obligatory for all humans 
27 The common good of the Universe is also the glory of God, for artisan’s work glorifies 
him, and God–the perfect Artisan–cannot work for any finality lower than Himself.
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without exception as they are deduced from the human rational nature 
(thereby being obligatory even if the supernatural order was not open to 
men); and also since the Natural Law can be known naturally, using the light 
of reason, without the need of supernatural faith or human magisterium.
Precepts of the Natural Law
The Natural Law includes all necessary to conserve the natural order 
established by the Creator, and known by human reason independent 
of any positive law. Its precepts can be divided as28: a) Primary and most 
universal precepts, ignorance of which is impossible to anyone who has 
use of his reason, though one can be mistaken about what is objectively 
evil. St. Thomas reduces these to a simple rule: ‘Good is to be done and 
pursued, and evil is to be avoided’. b) Secondary principles or proximate 
conclusions, which are derived plainly from the first precepts and are known 
almost without great force of reasoning. The precepts of the Decalogue 
belong to this category29, and thus inculpable ignorance regarding them is 
possible only for some time, and not for an entire normal life. This happens 
since, though these principles are easily deduced by simple reasoning, it can 
occur that–due to ignorance, ambient conditions in which one is brought 
up, a priori prejudices etc.–the simple and unlearned may not arrive at the 
immediate conclusions of the first principles (like the malice of internal 
acts, theft in case of necessity, etc.) However, this state cannot be prolonged 
indefinitely without suspecting the malice of these acts or learning about 
it from social contact. c) Remote conclusions, which are derived from the 
primary and secondary precepts by logical deductions that are complex. 
Examples of these are the indissolubility of marriage, the proscription on 
private vengeance etc. Inculpable ignorance in this matter for a prolonged 
28 St. Thomas (in S. T. I-II q.94, a.2) describes the classes of precepts derived from the 
primary precept: “Good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary. 
Hence all things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally learnt by reason 
as being good, and consequently, as objects of pursuit; and their contraries as evil, as 
objects to be avoided. Thus, from this, according to the order of natural inclinations, is 
the order of the precepts of the Natural Law”.
29 The third precept of the Decalogue is part of the Natural Law insomuch as it stipulates 
that external cult must be rendered to God, but not insomuch as the day (Sabbath).
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period is possible, especially for the uncivilized, and even amongst eminent 
moralists, there can be a discrepancy of opinions in some very intricate 
matters (Royo Marín, 1996, p.135). In Catholic doctrine, a transgression 
by inculpable ignorance of a precept of the Natural Law constitutes a sin 
materially, but not formally.30 On the other hand, a formal violation of 
conscience–even in matter that is not objectively sinful–constitutes a sin. 
Since the Natural Law is intrinsically linked to Synderesis, within man, 
we now must pass on to the question of liberty. 
Man is Free but not to do Evil
That humans possess liberty follows from the unmistakable testimony 
of conscience itself, the universal consent of all peoples and the very 
intellectual nature of man: man is free because he has intelligence. Liberty 
is not a potency distinct from the will. The object of the will is the good 
proposed by the intellect: if an absolute good–without any defect of fault–
is shown to the will, it throws itself towards this good in a necessary way. 
However, shown a partial or incomplete good, the will can desire the object 
(considering its salutary aspects), or can reject it (fixing itself on the defects 
and imperfections). Thus, man’s will is entirely free with respect to all 
particular and imperfect goods, though it is not free with relation to the sum 
of all goods (happiness in itself ) or the Absolute and Universal Good (God 
Himself )31. However, human liberty does not imply the freedom to choose 
between good and evil (cf. DzH 4317)32: the choice of evil enslaves and is not 
30 In this, the wisdom, equilibrium and benevolence of Catholic morality can be seen over 
other ‘systems’ like those of Luther, Calvin, and the Jansenists who affirm the contrary. 
Their doctrine was formally condemned by the Church - D. 1292. The Catechism 
expounds on the Natural Law and its relation with conscience and divine Law in CCC 
– no. 1950-1960. Also see CCC – no. 2036.
31 On liberty, its existence and nature, St. Thomas has an extensive and interesting treatise 
in: De Veritate, q.22 and q.24. In a more concise manner, the same is found in: S.T. I, 
q. 82 and q. 83. 
32 The physical capacity to do evil does not signify an increase of liberty but an imperfection 
and a defect of liberty. Therefore Leo XIII (1888, n.7) repeats St. Thomas’ explanation 
(In lo, 8,34. 1.4 n.1204) that each being acts according to its nature. When a being is 
moved by an impulse contrary to its nature, it does not act freely but as a slave. Now, 
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true liberty, but rather libertinism. How many errors are caused nowadays 
because of a lamentable confusion between liberty and libertinism!33
SYNDERESIS, LIBERTY AND THE NATURAL LAW
Now, conscience points out correctly that one must choose what is good 
and avoid evil, and can also–if based on sound principles–attain to the 
last details of what should be done. However, in spite of this, one can still 
choose to do evil. Here one acts against one’s own reason: one abuses liberty 
and enslaves oneself (exacerbating one’s sensibility, weakening reason and 
deteriorating will power) as Christ declares in Jn 8:34. This slavery is a 
consequence of an act committed against the right reason (contrary to the 
inerrant habit of Synderesis)34. 
Therefore, only in following the dictates of Synderesis and the Natural 
Law, humans are truly free. In violating the Natural Law, and his own nature, 
man enslaves himself. John Paul II (1993, n.40): “The rightful autonomy 
of the practical reason means that man possesses in himself his own law, 
received from the Creator. Nevertheless, the autonomy of reason cannot 
mean that reason itself creates values and moral norms”. 
man, being rational by nature, when moved by reason towards a good act, is perfectly 
free. On sinning, he acts against reason and is enslaved. For this purpose the Lord says 
“Everyone who sins is a slave of sin” (Jn 8:34). Thus, the sad capacity to do evil, not 
only does not increase liberty, but diminishes it considerably. A supreme example of 
this is God–the absolutely Free Being (Freedom itself substantially!)–who is absolutely 
incapable of sin. For more on this, see Vernaux (1969, pp.184-186).
33 For this reason, Benedict XVI (2009) brilliantly says that: “Libertinism is not liberty, 
but on the contrary, the death of liberty”. 
34 Anyone who chooses to sin has to admit–or invent–a false particular principle to ‘deceive’ 
his conscience. On admitting a sophism, one gets enslaved by consenting to the tyranny 
of the passions over one’s own intelligence. This slavery continues till one realizes one’s 
error, abhors it, and admits that one’s principles were wrong. For this reasons, the famous 
Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola always start with the  ‘Principle and 
Foundation’, thus providing a clear and irrefutable base of sound principles to destroy 
the edifice of erroneous principles built up over time
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Liberty and Positive Laws
Accordingly, no law that opposes the Natural Law can be invented, even 
if sustained by a general consensus, for it would infringe on true freedom 
(cf. John Paul II, 1993, n. 43-44). Positive laws must harmonize with 
the Natural Law which Synderesis indicates. The order and well-being of 
human society, the harmony between men and the rest of the universe, 
and even world peace, depend largely on this, as John Paul II states (1993, 
n. 41): “Man’s genuine moral autonomy in no way means the rejection 
but rather the acceptance of the moral law, of God’s command”. Thus–he 
continues–human freedom and God’s law meet and are called to intersect, 
for “obedience to God is not, as some would believe, a heteronomy, as if 
the moral life were subject to the will of something all-powerful, absolute, 
extraneous to man and intolerant of his freedom.” 
Is it not true that many modern problems–like corruption, lack of 
ethics etc.–would be resolved if man’s debt that owes to himself, to others 
and to the order of the universe is considered? If world nations took care 
to formulate positive laws that mirror the Natural Law35 and stimulate its 
observance, society would perhaps attain the so ardently desired peace, the 
tranquility of order, according to the famed definition of St. Augustine (De 
Civitate Dei, lib.XIX, c.13): Pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. 
The words of Benedict XVI
Addressing the Congress on Natural Moral Law, the Holy Father Benedict 
XVI (2007) pronounced on the urgent necessity to reflect upon the theme 
of Natural Law and to rediscover its truth common to all men 
35 Some authors point out that since a person needs to apply the Natural Law to specific 
individual cases, the Natural Law alone is insufficient. Agreeing with this opinion or 
not, one must admit that in any case, positive laws cannot be frontally opposed to the 
Natural Law. Obviously, positive human laws are necessary to complement and facilitate 
the observance of the Natural Law, but from this necessity, one cannot conclude that 
these positive laws can be opposed to the Natural Law, for it is impossible to complement 
the Natural Law by opposing it! Also, no one can soundly defend the necessity to create 
laws that frontally oppose man’s very nature and his rational being! 
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The method that permits us to know ever more deeply the rational 
structures of matter makes us ever less capable of perceiving the source of 
this rationality: creative Reason. The capacity to see the laws of material 
being makes us incapable of seeing the ethical message contained in 
being, a message that tradition calls lex naturalis, natural moral law. 
This word for many today is almost incomprehensible […] The fact that 
nature, being itself, is no longer a transparent moral message creates a 
sense of disorientation that renders the choices of daily life precarious 
and uncertain. 
Pointing out that the Natural Law is accessible to all even today since 
it is written on the human heart, Benedict XVI (2007) showed how all 
rights and duties flow from the primary principle of the Natural Law, and 
concluded that “the Natural Law, together with fundamental rights, is the 
source from which ethical imperatives also flow, which it is only right to 
honor.” For this reason, he recalled that “every juridical methodology, be 
it on the local or international level, ultimately draws its legitimacy from 
its rooting in the Natural Law”, which is “the only valid bulwark against 
the arbitrary power or the deception of ideological manipulation”. And so, 
The knowledge of this law inscribed on the heart of man increases with 
the progress of the moral conscience. The first duty for all, and particularly 
for those with public responsibility, must therefore be to promote the 
maturation of the moral conscience. This is the fundamental progress 
without which all other progress proves non-authentic.
In short, only in attending to the law written on the human heart due 
to the possession of Synderesis, can authentic progress that is based on a 
sound public juridical system and on peace be attained.
CONCLUSION
At the end of this article, which has tried to establish bridges, between 
systematic and moral theology, philosophy and law in order to establish a 
solid ontological base for the teachings of the Church and for the moral 
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edifice it proposes, we can conclude that the exigencies of the Magisterium 
are in harmony with the very internal order of the rational creature and 
with the order of the Universe created by God. For this reason, no Supreme 
Pontiff or other ecclesiastical authority can, even if this would lead to greater 
approval by influential persons, organizations or governments establish 
norms contrary to the perennial teaching of the Church. Consequently, 
when the Church and Her pastors insist on directives regarding the Christian 
way of life, this amounts to defending true human freedom.
 It is hoped that that this study may help theologians, as an attempt–
amongst others–for a new hermeneutics starting out from human nature, 
while also helping those entrusted with the People of God to carry out a more 
authentic and fruitful evangelization by encouraging a better comprehension 
of the recent ‘controversial’ stances of the Church. Finally, it is hoped that 
this article may offer a concrete path for a new order in which laws and 
world relations may not be based on arbitrary and egoistic dictums, but 
rather on a denominator common to all men, so that they may enjoy the 
peace for which all strive. 
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